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Abstract 
Little is known about perceptions of medical expenditure risks despite their 
presumed relevance to health insurance demand. This paper reports on a 
unique elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical expenditures from rural 
Ethiopians who are offered the opportunity to purchase health insurance. We 
find that expectations are positively correlated with past expenses to a degree 
that exceeds the serial correlation in realized expenditures, suggesting 
overestimation of persistence and underestimation of the potential gains from 
insurance. Despite the fact that forecast expenditures do predict realized 
expenditures to some extent, there is no evidence that expectations influence 
the decision to take out health insurance, although plans to insure are 
positively related to the perceived dispersion of medical expenses. 
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1. Introduction 
Reduction in exposure to medical expenditure risk underpins the case for social health 
insurance and is presumed to motivate enrolment in voluntary health insurance. Yet little is 
known of the incidence and magnitude of such risk in developing countries, and even less is 
known about the formation of risk perceptions. Cross-sectional measurement of inter-
household variation in medical expenditures confounds uncertainty faced by each household 
with differences in spending across households that are predictable from characteristics not 
fully observable in the data but known to the household. Panel data of sufficient length to 
identify the stochastic properties of medical expenditures, which would feed into a measure 
of risk at the household level, are rare (Feenberg and Skinner 1994; French and Jones 2004); 
possibly even non-existent in a developing country context. Even if such data were available, 
using them to infer perceived medical expenditure risk would  impose the assumption that 
expectations are formed rationally on the basis of all information available. The validity of this 
assumption has not been tested. In fact, very little is known about how individuals forecast 
their health expenditures and their ability to do so in any context (Breyer et al., 2012).  
Improved knowledge of the formation of expectations regarding health care 
expenditure, perceptions of the associated financial risks and the degree to which the 
demand for insurance is related to such risks is essential for a better understanding of the 
functioning of insurance markets and for evaluation of social insurance programmes. Tests 
for adverse selection in health insurance based on the association between coverage and 
realized expenditures are plagued by the difficultly of disentangling selection from moral 
hazard (Chiappori, 2000). The relationship between forecast expenditure and enrolment 
potentially offers a more direct test (Hendren, 2013). 
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This paper reports on the elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical 
expenditures in rural Ethiopia. It examines the extent to which expectations are based on past 
realized expenditures and whether uptake of health insurance is related to both the mean 
and dispersion of the distribution of forecast medical expenses. If individuals base their 
expectations and insurance purchases on determinants of medical expenditures that the 
insurer is either not able to observe or, as in the Ethiopian programme, is prevented from 
utilising in setting the premium, then adverse selection will arise. While rational agents will 
behave in this way, it is by no means obvious that unsophisticated consumers, with little or 
no experience of health insurance, perhaps little appreciation of factors that raise medical 
spending and possibly limited ability to predict their expenses, will do so. Particularly, but not 
only, in low-income contexts, the questions of how expectations of medical expenses are 
formed and utilized are very much open. We address them directly.  
Besides the relevance of our analysis to the operation of voluntary health insurance in 
low-income settings -- particularly in Ethiopia, where nationwide scale-up of the pilot scheme 
examined here is planned -- the paper makes a modest methodological contribution. The high 
degree of risk exposure in low-income, rural settings has prompted experimentation with the 
elicitation of subjective probabilities of economic outcomes (e.g. Delavande 2008; Bellemare 
2009; Giné et al 2009; Santos and Barrett 2011; Delavande and Kohler 2012; McKenzie et al. 
2013). The emerging consensus is that it is feasible to elicit informative expectations data 
from low-income, poorly educated populations (Attanasio 2009; Delavande et al. 2011; 
Delavande, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to elicit beliefs about 
future spending on health care in any setting -- high- or low-income. Respondents were asked 
to report probabilities that their  spending on medical care would exceed certain thresholds. 
Clearly, the information content of such data depends on the ability of individuals with limited 
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education to understand relatively complex survey questions and to express beliefs consistent 
with the basic laws of probability. A central aim of the study is to establish whether it is 
possible to collect data on expectations that are valid in the sense of being logically consistent 
and plausibly informative of beliefs about future spending on health care.  
We find that the bulk of the sample is able to respond sensibly to a seemingly abstract 
exercise of assessing the likelihood of future health scenarios and their associated medical 
expenses. Having verified the basic validity of the data, we make a distributional assumption 
that allows us to derive the first two moments of the distribution of future medical 
expenditure perceived by each household. Subsequently, we examine the information 
respondents utilise in forming expectations of medical expenditure, before evaluating the 
predictive value of expectations and, finally, assessing the extent to which health insurance 
enrolment is predicated on the expectation and perceived risk of medical expenses.  
We find that the sample average of the second moment of each household’s forecast 
medical expenditure is substantially smaller than the cross-sectional variance in realized 
medical expenditure, confirming that cross-sectional measures confound risk with 
predictable heterogeneity across households. Expected spending is positively related to past 
levels to an extent that exceeds the serial correlation in realized expenditure. This suggests 
that households underestimate volatility, which would reduce the perceived gains from 
insurance. Expected spending is positively correlated with realized spending in the period 
over which the forecast is made. After conditioning on observable covariates, expected 
expenditure still predicts realized spending (albeit weakly) suggesting that respondents hold 
some additional relevant information that is incorporated in their reported subjective 
probabilities. However, there is little or no evidence that expectations influence the decision 
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to take out health insurance, although plans to insure are positively related to the perceived 
dispersion of medical expenses.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the  sampling  and the elicitation 
of subjective probabilities of health payments. Section 3 assesses the validity of the 
expectations data. In section 4, we compare moments of forecast medical expenditure with 
past and realized spending. Section 5 examines factors associated with the formation of 
beliefs concerning the mean and dispersion of future health spending. Section 6 assesses the 
extent to which expectations add value in predicting future spending. Section 7 examines 
whether the perceived distribution of expenditure is utilised in the decision to enrol in 
insurance. The final section offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. Survey data and belief elicitation instrument 
2.1 Sampling design 
Three rounds of household panel data were collected in 16 rural districts located in four of 
the nine regions of Ethiopia (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR). These regions account 
for about 86 percent of the country’s population (Population Census Commission, 2008). 
Within each district, the first survey round was fielded in six randomly chosen Kebeles (lowest 
administrative unit) in March-April 2011. In each of the 96 Kebeles, 17 households were 
randomly selected yielding a total of 1,632 households comprising 9,455 individuals. After the 
introduction of a government-sponsored voluntary health insurance scheme in 12 of the 16 
districts in June-July 2011, two follow-up surveys of the same households, on which the bulk 
of the paper is based, were  fielded in March-April 2012 (N=1599 households) and March-
April 2013 (N=1583).  
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The sample households are predominantly engaged in agriculture (84% farmers), have 
very low levels of education (45% uneducated) and are very poor (23% qualify for a safety net 
food programme).1 
Within the 12 districts in which the insurance scheme operates, enrolment is voluntary 
at the household level. Premia vary across regions but not across households within regions.2 
The benefit package is comprehensive including both outpatient and inpatient care with very 
few exclusions. There are no co-payments provided higher levels of care are accessed through 
referral from a health center. Without a referral, households are liable for 50 percent of the 
cost of hospital treatment. By April 2012, the scheme had achieved an enrolment rate of 
around two-fifths of households residing in the targeted districts, and by April 2013 coverage 
had reached around one half. 
2.2 Elicitation of expectations 
A respondent, usually the head of the household or the spouse of the head, was asked about 
anticipated payments for health care and medicines over the next 12 months. This  proceeds 
by first asking preliminary questions to fix the range of the distribution of future expenditure 
and then asking the respondent to report the probability of exceeding thresholds within this 
range (Dominitz and Manski 1997; Manski 2004; Attanasio and Augsburg 2012). The specific 
questions used to determine the minimum and maximum amounts were:  
Imagine that no member of your household contracts a NEW serious illness or 
injury  in the next 12 months. In such a case what would be the MINIMUM 
                                                          
1 The statistics quoted refer to the 2012 data and are percentages of heads of households. The safety net 
programme is the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) that operates in food insecure districts and targets 
food insecure households in such districts. For further descriptive statistics, see Appendix Table A3. 
 
2 The premium ranges from 10 Birr (US$ 0.6) to 15 Birr per household per month. In one region (Amhara), the 
premium varies with household size (3 Birr per individual per month but all individuals in the household must 
still be enrolled). The central government subsidizes a quarter of the premium while district and regional 
governments are expected to cover the costs of providing a fee waiver to the poorest 10 percent of the 
population. 
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amount of money your household would have to pay for health care and 
medicines (including transport costs) over the next 12 months? 
 
Imagine that at least one member of your household contracts a NEW serious 
illness or injury that requires treatment in a hospital in the next 12 months. In 
such a case what would be the MAXIMUM amount of money your household 
would have to pay for health care and medicines (including transport costs) 
over the next 12 months? 
 
The reference to a new illness is intended to ensure that long-standing health 
conditions that will continue to require treatment and medication are not overlooked in 
reporting the minimum and that the maximum refers to expenses that would be incurred 
were health to deteriorate markedly. The reference to hospital treatment in the maximum 
question is intended to prompt thought of the most expensive scenario.  
After establishing the range, enumerators were instructed to compute three 
thresholds that divide the range into four equal intervals.3 Respondents were then asked:  
How likely is it that the amount your household will spend on health care and 
medicines (including transport costs) in the next 12 months will be greater 
than: [amount defined by each of three thresholds] 
(see scale below which goes from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates no chance of 
happening and 10 indicates will definitely happen) [ruler shown]. 
 
If the respondent was unsure but thought it was more likely that the household  would 
spend more than the given threshold than not, then s/he was instructed to point somewhere 
between 0 and 10 but closer to 10 than 0 (and vice versa). Enumerators were instructed not 
to prompt for revision even if the responses did not seem sensible, e.g., because the reported 
likelihood of exceeding a higher threshold was greater than that reported for a lower 
threshold. 
                                                          
3 Enumerators were instructed to compute the three cut offs as: A=min+X, B=A+X, C=B+X, where X=(max-min)/4.  
7 
 
The expectations questions were asked immediately after questions about the 
affordability of insurance and after a series of questions about the incidence and economic 
consequences of illness and death in the household in the last 12 months. Respondents had 
therefore been primed to contemplate health-related expenses. 
2.3 Medical expenditure data 
 Prior to the expectations module, another recorded health care utilization and 
expenditures incurred. For each episode of illness experienced by any household member in 
the previous two months, the respondent was asked to report the type and quantity of 
ambulatory health care received and the payments made for consultation and diagnostics, 
medicine, transport and other associated health care costs. Additionally, all hospitalizations 
of household members in the previous 12 months were reported along with the costs 
incurred. The information on actual medical expenditure was recorded in all rounds of the 
survey, while the expectations were elicited in the last two rounds.  
 
3. Validity of the expectations data 
Our first objective is to establish whether it is feasible to elicit informative data on 
expectations of medical expenditures in the context of a poor rural economy.  
3.1 Response rates  
Only 19 of 1,599 households surveyed in 2012 did not respond to all of the expectations 
questions, and there were only two such households in 2013 (Table 1). Most of these 
incomplete responses did not report the minimum and/or maximum (12), or gave zero values 
for both (7), and were not asked to report subjective probabilities.  
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Table 1: Expectations data: non-response, enumerator errors & illogical responses 
 2012 2013 
Total number of observations 1599 1583 
   Non response 19 2 
   Enumerator error in calculation of thresholds 229 88 
    Enumerator error resulted in wrong ordering of thresholds 38 30 
Total usable observations 1542 1551 
   Illogical responses   
       One violation of monotonicity 66 127 
       Two violations of monotonicity 65 100 
       All reported probabilities zero  46 28 
Observations with illogical responses 177 255 
Total observations with logical responses 1365  
(85.4%) 
1303 
(82.3%) 
Notes: Observations are household respondents. Enumerator error refers to mistakes in 
computation of k=(max-min)/4, A=min+k, B=A+k or C=B+k. 27/32 (2012) and 33/57 (2013) 
enumerators made such errors. ‘….wrong ordering of thresholds’ refers to violation of 
max>C>B>A>min. Total usable observations = 1599-19-38 in 2012 and 1583-2-30 in 2013. 
Violation of monotoncity corresponds to e.g. P(X>A)<P(X>B) with A<B.   
 
A non-response rate of only 0.7% is reassuring, suggesting that the exercise is not too 
abstract. But mere participation is no guarantee that responses contain information on beliefs 
held with respect to future spending on health care. A basic requirement for the data to be 
informative is that the expenditure reported in the negative scenario  --  onset of new serious 
illness/injury that required hospitalization -- should not be lower than the expenditure 
reported for the most positive scenario -- no onset of any new illness/injury. Enumerators 
were instructed to prompt respondents to revise the amounts reported if this occurred, which 
did happen relatively frequently. 364 households (23%) in 2012 and 314 households (20%) in 
2013 were prompted to make a revision, suggesting a degree of difficulty in recognizing the 
brief scenarios as indicative of the least and most expensive outcomes with respect to medical 
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expenditures.4 Those prompted to revise their max/min values were more likely to report 
logically inconsistent probabilities (p value<0.001).  
Enumerators made mistakes in calculating the intended evenly-spaced thresholds for 
229 households (15%) in 2012 and 88 households (6%) in 2013 (Table 1). These errors do not 
emanate only from a few enumerators – in 2012 (2013) more than four-fifths (three-fifths) of 
the enumerators made at least one mistake. They are not fatal for the belief elicitation 
exercise provided that the thresholds calculated are in increasing order, even if they are not 
evenly spaced. This condition is violated only for 38 households in 2012 and 30 households in 
2013.  
In total, we lose 57 out of 1599 observations in 2012 and 32/1583 in 2013 due to non-
response or calculation errors. Households dropped are smaller, poorer and more likely to be 
headed by a female, to forgo health care when sick and to have a member with some sort of 
disability (Appendix Table A1). 
3.2 Illogical responses 
Consistency of responses with the axioms of probability requires that the reported 
probabilities of incurring health expenditure (X) in excess of a series of increasing thresholds 
(A<B<C) satisfy monotonicity: P(X > A) ≥ P(X > B) ≥ P(X > C). Responses that do not 
satisfy this condition are labelled illogical. Of the usable observations, 131 (8.5%) in 2012  and 
227 (14.6%)  in 2013 violated monotonicity at least once (Table 1). A further 46  and 28 in 
2012 and 2013 respectively reported zero probability of spending more than all three 
thresholds, which we also consider an error since the same respondents report a maximum 
                                                          
4 For 37 (in 2012) and 24 (2013) households, information on whether they were prompted to revise their 
responses is missing.  
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possible expenditure in excess of all three thresholds. In total, 177 respondents in 2012 
(11.5%) and 255 in 2013 (16.4%) reported probabilities that are logically inconsistent. This is 
higher than the 4 percent rate of logical response errors found by Attanasio and Augsburg 
(2012) in their study of subjective income expectations in rural India using a similar 
instrument but is comparable to Dominitz and Manski’s (1997) finding of a 10 percent error 
incidence for subjective expectations of income in Wisconsin.5  
Similar to those excluded because of non-response or enumerator errors, households 
providing illogical responses are more likely to be poorer, smaller, less healthy and more likely 
to forgo health care for economic reasons (Appendix Table A1). They are also less likely to be 
enrolled in the health insurance scheme and to be engaged in agricultural activities as their 
main occupation. 
3.3 Distribution of responses 
Distributions of the reported probabilities for each of the thresholds are presented in Figure 
1. There is no bunching at focal responses of 0%, 50% or 100%, which is often a feature of 
subjective probability data (Kleinjans and van Soest 2014). The most likely explanation is our 
use of a 0-10 reporting scale (subsequently transformed), rather than 0-100. While the 
narrower scale will result in less variation, the lack of bunching suggests that the loss of 
information may not be so severe.  
There is a clear shift in the mass of the distribution from right to left as the threshold 
is raised.  While this is inevitable since observations that violate monotonicity have been 
                                                          
5 After prompting for revisions, the incidence of illogical responses dropped to 5 percent in Dominitz and Manski 
(1997). Since a principal aim of the current study is to examine the ability of low educated individuals to report 
subjective probabilities, we decided not to allow revision, except with respect to the reported minimum and 
maximum values. 
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dropped, the degree of the shift is indicative of respondents understanding the question and 
reporting substantially lower probabilities as the threshold is raised. 
 
Figure 1: Distributions of reported probabilities of medical spending exceeding various thresholds  
 
 
 
Overall, the high response rate, the majority of usable, logically consistent responses 
(85 percent in 2012 and 82 percent in 2013), the lack of bunching and the anticipated shift in 
the mass of the distribution suggest that the bulk of the sample is able to respond sensibly to 
a seemingly abstract exercise of contemplating and assessing the likelihood of future health 
scenarios and their associated medical expenses. This lends support to interpretation of the 
responses of each household as points on its perceived cumulative distribution function of  
future medical expenditure. 
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4. Distributions and correlations of forecast and realized  medical expenditure 
4.1. Moments of forecast medical expenditure distributions 
We assume that a piecewise uniform distribution provides a reasonable approximation to the 
underlying probability distribution for each household and use this, along with the elicited 
subjective probabilities, to compute the first and second moments of the distribution of 
health expenditure in the next 12 months perceived by each household.6 We do the same for 
the distribution of the logarithm of expenditures.  
Table 2: Sample statistics of forecast and realized medical expenditure, 2012 (ETB) 
   Cross-section statistics 
   Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Min. Median Max. N 
 Forecast Expenditure (t+1)       
  Mean 461 562 2.40 305 6375 1365 
  Standard deviation 173 256 1.08 101 3320 1365 
  Coeff. of variation 0.35 0.18 0.02 0.34 1.08 1365 
 Realized Expenditure (t)       
  Simple extrapolation 393 1441 0 0 19830 1365 
  Regression extrapolation 390 1047 ~0 120 16476 1355 
If realized expenditure >0       
 Mean forecast expenditure (t+1) 520 641 21 326 6375 398 
 Realized expenditure (t) 1349 2418 6 480 19830 398 
Notes: Simple and regression extrapolation of realized expenditures refer to method of estimating annual 
spending on outpatient care from reported expenditure in past two months, as explained in text.  Sample size 
for regression extrapolation is slightly smaller due to missing values on covariates. ETB = Ethiopian Birr, 
US$1=ETB 17.42 (April 2012) 
 
The top panel of Table 2 provides sample summary statistics of parameters of the 
household-specific distribution of forecast medical expenditure derived from the probabilities 
reported in the 2012 survey (see Appendix Table A2 for 2013). The household-specific mean 
of forecast annual expenditure (i.e. the first moment of the  subjective distribution) ranges 
from ETB 2.40 (US$ 0.14) to ETB 6375 (US$ 365.97), with a sample mean of ETB 461 (US$ 
                                                          
6 From only three subjective probabilities it is not possible to establish which type of distribution fits the data 
best (Attanasio and Augsburg, 2012).  
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26.41). Comparison with the distribution of realized expenditures in the prior year is 
complicated by the fact that spending on outpatient care is reported for a period of two 
months preceding the survey. We approximate annual expenditure by simple extrapolation, 
i.e. multiplying  outpatient expenditure by six and adding the result to inpatient expenditure 
reported for the past twelve months. While this provides a credible estimate of mean annual 
expenditure across the sample, it will overestimate the inter-household variance. Therefore, 
we also predict outpatient expenditure in the last two months for each household from a 
Poisson regression  of reported expenditure on covariates (Jones, 2011) and multiply this 
prediction by six before adding it to reported inpatient expenditure (referred to in Table 2 as 
regression extrapolation).7 This gives the same sample mean as the simple extrapolation 
method but a smaller variance, which in this case is an underestimate of the cross-sectional 
variance in annual expenses.8  
The sample mean of the first moment of forecast expenditure is about one-sixth 
greater than the mean of realized expenditures. The discrepancy appears to be attributable 
to the large difference in the propensity of zero expenditures. Despite the large proportion of 
households with no reported spending on health care (71% by the simple extrapolation 
method), respondents seldom contemplate making no payments even when told to think of 
a scenario in which no new serious illness or injury is contracted and health spending is at a 
                                                          
7 Covariates (see Appendix Table A3) include household size and demographics, the head of household’s 
education and occupation, measures of economic status, dummies for household level chronic health problems, 
paralysis, self-assessed health status, difficulty in hearing or speaking and a death in the household in the 
previous year and 96 village dummies. We deliberately do not include indicators of acute illness since the aim is 
to predict recurring expenditures based on stable characteristics. 
 
8  The small difference in the two sample means is due to missing values of some of the covariates included in 
the regression model. 
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minimum.9 Restricting attention to households that incurred medical expenditures, the 
sample mean of these positive expenditures is 2.7 times the mean of the expected 
expenditures. This difference partly arises from the simple extrapolation of two-monthly 
expenditures on outpatient care, which will greatly overestimate annual expenditures for 
some households. The median of realized (positive) expenditure is closer to that of forecast 
expenditure, although the difference is still substantial. 
It is important to emphasise that the sample distribution of expected expenditures 
should not resemble that of realized expenditures. The former is a distribution of 
expectations, while the latter is a distribution of stochastic outcomes. The range and standard 
deviation of realized expenditures should be, and are, much greater than the corresponding 
sample statistics for the expected expenditure. 
The sample mean of the household-specific standard deviation of forecast 
expenditure is only one-sixth of the cross-section standard deviation of realized expenditure 
based on the regression extrapolation approach, and an even lower proportion of the 
estimate using simple extrapolation of outpatient expenditures. On average across the 
sample, the household-specific standard deviation is less than the respective mean (the 
coefficient of variation is a little more than a third, on average), while, as is common with 
cross-section data on health care spending (e.g. Van Doorslaer et al, 2007), the standard 
deviation across households is substantially larger than the sample mean. These comparisons 
suggest there is substantial overestimation of risk exposure using measures based on cross-
sectional variance. Such measures confound risk with predictable heterogeneity across 
households. Measures of dispersion in the distribution of forecast expenditure do not. They 
                                                          
9 In 2012, only 3 respondents (of the 1599) stated a minimum health expenditure of zero. Admittedly, this may 
reflect a deficiency in the question, which did not emphasise that zero expenditure was a permitted response. 
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capture perceptions of risk. The discrepancy between the two approaches would be 
substantially reduced by examining the cross-sectional variation in realized expenditures 
conditional on observable determinants (Flores and O’Donnell, 2013). But not all predictors 
that are known to the household are likely to be documented in the data, such that cross-
sectional variance (of residuals) is still likely to overestimate risk perceived by the household, 
and consequently, according to theory, its demand for single-period insurance. 
4.2 Correlation between expected and past medical expenditure 
The degree to which medical expenditures display persistence over time and the extent to 
which this is taken into account in the formation of expectations about future medical 
spending are of considerable importance to the operation of health insurance markets 
(Breyer et al. 2012).  
The serial correlation between actual health expenditure in ETB money values 
incurred in consecutive years is small and not significantly different from zero for either pair 
of years (Table 3, top panel). The correlation is even lower for expenditure on inpatient care, 
but it is not significant for spending on outpatient care either. Serial correlation is more 
evident in the logarithm of expenditure (bottom panel), particularly for spending on 
outpatient care, which suggests that extremely high expenditures that are not repeated from 
year to year reduce the linear correlation in amounts.10 Still, the correlations are considerably 
smaller than those obtained for health care costs in Europe and the US.11 A likely reason is 
                                                          
10 Further evience of this is that censoring expenses at the 99th percentile of the distribution of positive 
expenditures increases the magnitudes of the correlations of monetary amounts and results in those for total 
expenditure and outpatient expenditure in 2011-2012 becoming significant.  
 
11 For example, Di Nardi et al (2015) find a correlation coefficient of 0.57 for total health care costs in consecutive 
years for older persons in the US. Bakx et al (2015) report a correlation of 0.66 for total health expenditures 
calculated for the whole population of the Netherlands.  
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that the higher burden of infectious disease and acute illness in Ethiopia reduces the serial 
correlation in medical expenditures relative to that observed in high-income, more elderly 
populations experiencing a greater relative burden of chronic illness.12 The apparently high 
degree of volatility in medical expenses indicates substantial potential gains from risk pooling. 
Table 4 shows correlations between expected and realized medical spending. Using 
actual expenditures reported in all three survey rounds and subjective probabilities reported 
in the latter two rounds, we can examine the correlation between expected expenditure for 
the year ahead and actual spending up to three years previous.13 All correlations are positive. 
The one between expectations and three year lagged actual spending is the smallest and is 
not significant. For both survey rounds in which expectations are reported, they are more 
closely correlated with spending over the last year than with spending in the year prior to the 
last (but this decline is statistically significant only for the 2013 survey).  This suggests that 
expectations are based on more recent information. The positive correlations are not simply 
driven by the large proportion of households incurring no health expenditure expecting to 
spend little in the future. In fact, when attention is restricted to households with positive past 
levels of spending, the correlations increase (Table 4, bottom panel). 
The significant positive correlation of expectations with past expenditure is in contrast 
to the absence of serial correlation in actual spending (at least when measured in money 
values, not logs). While we must acknowledge that our ability to estimate the latter is limited 
                                                          
12 Restricting attention to the sample of households who reported chronic illness in both periods raises the 
correlation coefficient of total medical expenditure substantially to 0.062 for 2011-2012 and 0.097 for 2012-
2013, although neither reaches significance. The low serial correlation will be partly due to spending on 
outpatient care being reported only for the last two months. Month-to-month fluctuations in spending will lower 
the correlation over two periods of two months separated by one year relative to the correlation of annual 
expenditures over consecutive years. 
 
13 In the table, we show correlations with realized total expenditure computed by the simple extrapolation 
method (i.e. outpatient*6+inpatient). If instead with simply add two-monthly outpatient expenditure to 
inpatient expenditure, the correlations generally decline somewhat in magnitude but maintain significance.  
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by the two-month recall period for outpatient expenses (see footnote 12), this discrepancy is 
at least indicative of adaptive expectations, rather than rational expectations, with the degree 
of persistence being overestimated. However, expectations are not entirely inaccurate. There 
is a significant positive correlation between the expectation for the year ahead derived from 
the subjective probabilities reported in 2012 and the expenditure that materialised over the 
following year (Table 4, 1st column, 4th row). This suggests that households are, at least to 
some extent, able to predict their future spending on medical care. 
Table 3. Correlation between realized medical expenditure in consecutive years 
  2011-2012 2012-2013 
ETB Amounts   
  Total 0.033  0.020  
  Outpatient 0.030  0.015  
  Inpatient 0.001  0.007  
Logs   
  Total 0.122*** 0.130*** 
  Outpatient 0.129*** 0.105*** 
  Inpatient 0.058** 0.006 
Number of observations 1365 1122 
 Notes: Total expenditure is computed by simple extrapolation method.Data in 2012 and 
2013 are restricted to the sample with logical responses to expectations questions as 
detailed in Table 1. When taking logs, zero values are replaced by one half of the smallest 
positive value. ***, ** and * indicate significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Table 4. Correlations between expected and realized medical expenditure 
  Expenditure expected in t+1 
Realized 
expenditure 
t=2012 t=2013 
 t-2                            N/A                        0.043 
 t-1                         0.128***                        0.069** 
 t                         0.136***                        0.221*** 
 t+1                         0.138***                           N/A 
If realized exp. >0   
 t-2                            N/A                         0.045 
 t-1                         0.143***                         0.089* 
 t                         0.192***                         0.334*** 
 t+1                         0.186***                             N/A 
Notes: Realized expenditure calculated by multiplying outpatient expenditure reported for last 
two months by six and adding result to inpatient expenditure reported for the last year.  
N/A - data on realized expenditure are not available. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Formation of medical expenditure expectations 
5.1 Predictors of the household-specific mean 
In Table 5, we present least squares regressions of the household-specific mean of log 
expected expenditure on past realized expenditures and other household characteristics 
potentially relevant to the formation of expectations.14 The regressions are estimated from 
the pooled 2012 and 2013 observations. The estimates may be interpreted as best linear 
predictions, revealing how expectations correlate with observable characteristics (Dominitz, 
2001). Past outpatient and inpatient expenditures incurred in the year in which expectations 
were elicited as well as expenditures incurred in the previous year are entered separately 
because it is plausible that differences in the nature of health conditions that result in 
outpatient and inpatient expenditures lead to their differential weighting in the formation of 
expectations. The specification is consistent with adaptive expectations, which implies that 
expected spending is a weighted average of realized spending in previous periods (Nerlove, 
1958), although we do not claim to be testing this hypothesis.15 Inclusion of the lagged value 
of outpatient expenditure is particularly appropriate because of the two-month reference 
period that results in a partial measure of the information on such spending the household 
may utilise to predict spending in the coming year. Besides past expenditures, the regressions 
include indicators of: i) health (illness, sensory impairment, disability, health self-assessed as 
poor/very poor and a recent death in the household); ii) socioeconomic status (wealth 
represented by quintile groups of a principal components score derived from assets and 
                                                          
14 Estimates from a least absolute deviation regression are generally consistent with those of least squares with 
respect to identification of characteristics that significantly predict the household-specific mean. See Appendix 
Table A4. 
 
15 The analysis is intended to be descriptive with the purpose of assessing whether the subjective probabilities 
reported are sufficiently correlated with factors one would anticipate may be utilised in the formation of 
expectations such that there are grounds to interpret the data as expectations.  
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housing conditions, participation in a safety net programme, possession of a savings account, 
occupation and education);  iii) health care coverage/access (health insurance enrolment, 
reported forgone care when sick and time to nearest health center); iv) reported experience 
of an economic/crime/conflict/natural shock in past year; and, v) household size and 
demographics. Definitions and means of the covariates are provided in the Appendix, Table 
A3.  
The  predictions account for around 30 percent of the variability in the household-
specific means across the sample indicating a good deal of systematic variation. The reported 
expected medical expenditures are very far from being pure noise.  
Inpatient expenditure in the last year and outpatient expenditure both in the last two 
months and in the two months preceding the previous survey are all statistically significant 
predictors of the mean of (log) forecast medical expenditure in the year to come. The latter 
is not significantly associated with expenses incurred on inpatient care in the year preceding 
the last. This may be because inpatient treatment is received for more acute conditions while 
outpatient expenditures include medication taken for more chronic conditions. Using the 
usual approximation, a 1% increase in inpatient expenditure over the last year is associated 
with a 0.14% increase in the expectation of total medical expenditure in the coming year. The 
elasticity with respect to outpatient expenditure in the last two months is smaller, which is to 
be expected given the discrepancy in the reference periods.16 But expectations are also 
positively related to spending on outpatient care in the two months prior to the last survey, 
which is consistent with respondents forming expectations on the basis of average spending 
over a number of periods.  
                                                          
16 A one percent increase in outpatient expenses in the last two months is likely to imply a less than one percent 
increase in annual expenditure assuming that the increase is not repeated in every other two monthly period 
throughout the year. 
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Given the magnitude of expenditures on inpatient care, one expects that households 
can remember and report them accurately. Even if errors are made, provided the reported 
expenditures are those utilised in the formation of expectations of future spending, there will 
be no bias in the estimate of the association between expected and (perceived) past 
expenditure. However, expenditures on ambulatory care and medicines reported for the last 
two months are a noisy indicator of actual expenditures on these items in the last year. We 
deal with this by instrumenting household reported outpatient expenditure in the two 
months before each survey with respective mean outpatient expenditure in the Kebele in 
which the household is located. Two stage least squares coefficients reported in the second 
column of Table 5 show substantial increases in the coefficients on each of the two 
instrumented expenditure variables, which become comparable to the elasticity estimated 
for inpatient expenditure in the last year. Most of the coefficients of the other covariates 
remain similar in magnitude and significance to the OLS estimates. 
Expected spending on medical care appears to be very closely correlated with ability 
to pay. On the basis of the OLS estimate, the wealthiest quintile group identified by the 
composite assets index spends two-thirds more on medical care in the coming year than the 
poorest fifth of households. Households in which the head has some form of education expect 
to spend 8.4% more than those without any education. 
Enrolment in the health insurance scheme is positively but not significantly correlated 
with expected medical spending. The point estimate suggests that households that require 
more time to travel to a health center expect to spend more. Although this is (marginally) 
significant only for OLS, it is consistent with the inclusion of transport costs in the expenses 
respondents are instructed to report.  
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Table 5. Pooled regression of household-specific mean of log forecast medical expenditure 
 OLS 2SLS 
  Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE 
     
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0225*** (0.00762) 0.101** (0.0503) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0418*** (0.00876) 0.130*** (0.0419) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.141*** (0.0219) 0.129*** (0.0251) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 0.00439 (0.0222) -0.0126 (0.0244) 
Someone in household has:     
    Illness > 30 days 0.173** (0.0754) 0.0585 (0.0948) 
    Sensory impairment 0.00896 (0.0613) 0.00626 (0.0617) 
    Paralysis/mobility issues -0.0163 (0.0586) -0.0463 (0.0628) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.0826 (0.0729) -0.0264 (0.0828) 
    Died in last year 0.149 (0.129) 0.0967 (0.140) 
Assets quintile groups  
(ref. is bottom)     
     2nd bottom 0.208*** (0.0592) 0.199*** (0.0621) 
     Middle 0.298*** (0.0594) 0.291*** (0.0606) 
     2nd top 0.404*** (0.0635) 0.375*** (0.0690) 
     Top 0.669*** (0.0713) 0.621*** (0.0760) 
Covered by safety net 
programme -0.0608 (0.0597) -0.0494 (0.0658) 
Has bank account 0.0916 (0.0677) 0.0799 (0.0680) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.162 (0.129) 0.137 (0.126) 
Educated head 0.0842** (0.0389) 0.0725* (0.0416) 
Health insurance enrolled 0.0423 (0.0431) 0.0607 (0.0419) 
Forgone care when sick -0.116 (0.119) -0.0911 (0.125) 
Minutes to nearest health 
center 0.000778* (0.00047) 0.000702 (0.00049) 
Shock 0.106** (0.0500) 0.103** (0.0513) 
Ln(household size) 0.000928 (0.0606) -0.0635 (0.0697) 
Year 2013 0.298*** (0.0690) 0.331*** (0.0647) 
Constant 3.588*** (0.200) 3.670*** (0.208) 
     
Observations 2,631  2,631  
R2 0.298  0.241  
F-test  of joint significance  
(p-values):     
     All variables 0.000  0.000  
     Health variables 0.055  0.833  
     Age-sex composition 0.010  0.003  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in ten gender specific 
age groups and district dummies. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at Kebele level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
Of the health variables, only illness with symptoms that have lasted for at least one month is 
individually significantly correlated with the mean of log forecast medical expenditure. This 
variable loses significance when outpatient expenditure in the last two months is 
instrumented, which is consistent with both variables providing information on health that is 
utilised in the formation of expectations of medical expenses.17 The health variables are 
jointly significant when estimating by OLS but not by 2SLS. Households that reported having 
experienced a negative shock due to the local economy, weather, crime or conflict in the last 
year expect to incur greater expenditure on medical care in the coming year. Notwithstanding 
the fact that there has been some control for health, the most likely explanation would appear 
to be illness or injury as a result of such an event. The demographic composition of the 
household appears to matter. The coefficients are not presented but expected expenditure is 
lower in households that have a larger share of elderly (60+) females relative to all other 
demographic groups. 
Regressions analogous to those presented in Table 5 reveal much less systematic 
variation in the standard deviation of log forecast expenditure (see Appendix Table A6). In 
particularly, this measure does not appear to be associated with past realizations of 
expenditure or health suggesting that while the location of the subjective distribution shifts 
with these factors, its dispersion does not.  
5.2 Revisions to expectations   
The fact that the means of the distributions derived from reported subjective probabilities 
correlate with past realized expenditures, ability to pay proxies and health provides grounds 
                                                          
17 If the health variables are excluded from the OLS regression, then the coefficients on the past expenditure 
variables increase (results available on request). This is further indication that both sets of variables are capturing 
the extent to which expectations are formed on the basis of health-related information. 
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to interpret these means as expectations of future spending on medical care. However, the 
associations could arise from confounding factors correlated with both the reporting of 
subjective probabilities and the regressors. We deal with time invariant confounders by 
estimating in first differences. If the associations are preserved, this would provide stronger 
evidence that the data contain information on expectations that are revised in response to 
changes in realized expenditures, economic circumstances and health.  
The simple correlation between the change in expected expenditure and in realized 
outpatient expenditure is 0.061. The respective correlation with change in realized inpatient 
expenditure is 0.075. Both are statistically significant at 5% level. After controlling for 
covariates, the change in (log) expected medical expenditure continues to be positively and 
significantly associated with the change in realized outpatient and inpatient expenditures 
(Table 6). Expected spending does appear to be revised upward when actual spending in 
previous periods increases. The coefficient on both past outpatient expenditures increase 
somewhat relative to the levels estimates while that on inpatient expenditure in the last year 
falls. Inpatient expenditure in the previous to last year remains insignificant. Instrumenting 
the changes in outpatient spending with the Kebele specific mean changes results in increases 
in the outpatient coefficients. While most of the significant predictors in the models 
estimated in levels are no longer statistically significant, we continue to find that better-off 
households (in terms of asset quintiles and those with bank saving accounts) expect higher 
expenditure.18  
 
                                                          
18 The mean of log forecast expenditure is derived under the assumption that the distribution is piecewise 
uniform. This assumption can be avoided by examining variation in the log of the mid point of the reported 
minimum and maximum health expenditure.18 Regression estimates obtained using both levels and differences 
of this measure as the dependent variable are similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6 (see Appendix Table 
A5).  
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Table 6: First difference regressions of household-specific means of log forecast medical 
expenditure  
 OLS 2SLS 
 Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE 
        
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0386** (0.0148) 0.254*** (0.0778) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0507*** (0.0155) 0.283*** (0.0891) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.115** (0.0466) 0.120** (0.0516) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -0.0350 (0.0475) -0.0586 (0.0570) 
Someone in household has:     
    Illness > 30 days 0.0490 (0.136) 0.0203 (0.139) 
    Sensory impairment -0.0277 (0.0962) -0.0445 (0.110) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.0674 (0.0863) 0.0477 (0.0872) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.141 (0.114) 0.00600 (0.122) 
    Died in last year 0.146 (0.238) 0.174 (0.273) 
Assets quintile groups  
(ref. is bottom)  
 
 
 
     2nd bottom -0.00513 (0.0955) -0.0708 (0.0975) 
     Middle 0.0893 (0.115) -0.00940 (0.129) 
     2nd top 0.174 (0.120) 0.123 (0.132) 
     Top 0.562*** (0.148) 0.521*** (0.157) 
Covered  by safety net programme 0.176 (0.165) 0.252 (0.171) 
Has bank account 0.186* (0.111) 0.265** (0.110) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.182 (0.232) 0.0940 (0.244) 
Educated head 0.137 (0.0849) 0.102 (0.0933) 
Health insurance enrolled 0.0161 (0.0787) 0.0445 (0.0746) 
Forgone care when sick -0.114 (0.142) -0.155 (0.174) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000817 (0.00102) 0.000813 (0.00113) 
Shock 0.0943 (0.0760) 0.107 (0.0789) 
Ln(household size) 0.365 (0.248) 0.446 (0.273) 
Constant 0.328*** (0.0687) 0.387*** (0.0616) 
     
Observations 1,097  1,097  
R2 0.079     
F-test of joint significance (p-values):     
     All variables 0.000  0.000  
     Health variables 0.636  0.977  
     Age-sex composition 0.512  0.418  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific age 
groups. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at Kebele level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. Predictive value of expectations 
The regressions reported in the previous section reveal a good deal of systematic variation in 
expected expenditure with factors presumed relevant to future spending. But seventy 
percent of the variability in expectations remains unexplained. We now consider whether this 
unexplained variation is useful in predicting realized spending. If it is, then this would suggest 
that respondents hold information over and above that contained in covariates commonly 
available in surveys that enable them to form expectations that are somewhat accurate in 
predicting future medical expenses. And furthermore, that this private information is 
incorporated in reported subjective probabilities.  
 We employ a Generalised Linear Model (GLM) in which realized total medical 
expenditure is specified as an exponential function of covariates and estimate this by Gamma 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (GPML) (Gourieroux et al 1984; Manning and Mullahy 2001; 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). This is a commonly used estimator for medical expenditures 
(Jones 2011) and offers two main advantages in the present context. First, the estimator gives 
less weight to observations with a large conditional mean, which increases robustness to 
outliers that could arise from the potential measurement error in spending on outpatient 
care. Second, with a very large number of observations reporting no medical expenditure, 
substantial inconsistency could arise from adding an arbitrary constant to these zero values 
before taking logs and estimating in least squares (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). GPML 
avoids this by taking the log of the conditional expectation and performs well even with a very 
large proportion of zero values in the sample (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2011).  
Modeling total medical expenditure in 2013 as a function of the mean of log forecast 
expenditure for that year without controls gives a significant GPML coefficient of 0.228 
26 
 
(SE=0.115).19 This is consistent with the significant correlation coefficient between expected 
and realized expenditure given in Table 4 (column 1, row 4) and implies that a one percent 
increase in expected expenditure is associated with an approximate increase of 0.23 percent 
in the spending that does actually materialize. So, expectations do have some predictive 
accuracy. Do they also have predictive value in addition to the forecast that can be made on 
the basis of observable covariates?  
The first column of Table 7 gives GPML estimates from a model that includes the 2012 
values (and the 2011 value of total expenditure) of the same covariates used to predict the 
mean of forecast medical expenditure in Table 5. Lagged values of the covariates are used 
since the objective is to test whether expectations have predictive power after conditioning 
on observable information available to be incorporated into those expectations. Both lags of 
past expenditure are positively and significantly associated with actual expenditure in 2013. 
So, the serial correlation in log expenditures shown in Table 3 remains after controlling for 
covariates. Medical expenditure is also significantly associated with past health and it is 
substantially greater for households that were poorest according to the assets index in 2012. 
This may reflect a higher (unmeasured) disease burden among the poorest.  Strong 
dependence on ability to pay is reflected in the estimate of 86 percent lower spending by 
those who report forgoing health care in the past due to economic reasons.20 A standard 
deviation increase in travel time (=45 minutes) to the nearest health center is associated with 
                                                          
19 Total realized expenditure is computed as outpatient expenditure in the last two months multiplied by six, 
plus inpatient expenditure in the last year. If we instead use total realized expenditure computed by simply 
adding outpatient expenditure in the last two months to inpatient expenditure in the last year, we find a 
significant GPML coefficient of 0.261 (SE=0.133). Coefficients in Table 7 generally increase in magnitude and are 
robust in terms of significance when this alternative calculation of total realized expenditure is used. 
 
20 exp(-1.995)-1=-0.864. 
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a one-fifth increase in expenditure.21 This is presumably due to the cost of transport that is 
included in the measure of medical spending.  
In the second column of Table 7, we add the mean of log forecast expenditure. 
Realized expenditure is positively related to the expectation. The point estimate suggests that 
a one percent increase in the expectation is associated with a 0.08 percent increase in actual 
expenditure. This coefficient is not significant using a z-test but a likelihood ratio test rejects 
the model that excludes the expectation (LR=4.2, p-value=0.0404). Further, in an alternative 
specification that uses the mean of forecast expenditure in money units, rather than the mean 
of the log, the expectation variable is significant (10%) even using a z-test.22  
The coefficients on the other covariates are generally robust to adding the 
expectations variable, while the coefficient on the latter falls by around two-thirds when 
covariates are added (from 0.228 to 0.0799). Hence, most of the predictive value of expected 
expenditure comes from processing information available in observable covariates. But 
respondents appear to have some residual information relevant to their future medical 
expenditure that they draw on in answering the subjective probability questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 (exp(0.00454)-1)×45=0.1957. 
 
22 In the alternative specification, we also enter the lagged realized expenditures in levels rather than logs. As a 
further robustness check, we estimated by Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood, which weights all observations 
equally and so may be more sensitive to outliers, rather than GPML. In this case, the mean of expected 
expenditure is significant at 1%. Results from these alternative specifications and estimators are available on 
request. 
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 Table 7. Estimates of Generalised Linear Model of realized total medical expenditure in 2013 (Yt+1) 
  w/o expectations with expectations 
 Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE 
     
Et[lnYt+1]   0.0799 (0.113) 
ln Yt 0.119*** (0.0390) 0.117*** (0.0393) 
ln Yt-1 0.0622* (0.0333) 0.0604* (0.0325) 
Someone in the household has:    
    Illness > 30 days 1.029*** (0.343) 1.033*** (0.343) 
    Sensory impairment 0.0293 (0.273) 0.0501 (0.273) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.144 (0.280) 0.127 (0.279) 
    Poor/very poor health -0.342 (0.349) -0.354 (0.348) 
    Died in last year -0.867** (0.365) -0.875** (0.362) 
Assets quintile groups  
(ref. is bottom)  
 
 
 
     2nd bottom -0.584** (0.297) -0.615** (0.293) 
     Middle -0.536* (0.302) -0.583** (0.296) 
     2nd top -0.653** (0.312) -0.699** (0.318) 
     Top 0.481 (0.352) 0.398 (0.357) 
Covered by safety net programme -0.0461 (0.380) -0.0365 (0.382) 
Has bank account -0.00318 (0.261) 0.0416 (0.272) 
Non-agricultural employment -0.0949 (0.627) -0.112 (0.621) 
Educated head -0.141 (0.232) -0.144 (0.231) 
Health insurance enrolled 0.109 (0.252) 0.0884 (0.255) 
Forgone care when sick -1.995*** (0.586) -2.005*** (0.589) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.00434** (0.00211) 0.00438** (0.00210) 
Shock 0.205 (0.186) 0.186 (0.187) 
Ln(household size) 0.685* (0.359) 0.702* (0.359) 
Constant 2.612*** (0.947) 2.235** (1.120) 
     
Wald test of joint significance (p-values):    
     Health variables 0.004  0.004  
     District dummies 0.000  0.000  
     Age-sex composition 0.000  0.000  
Log-likelihood -8497.9  -8495.8  
Observations 1,330  1,330  
Notes: Table gives GPML estimates of total realized medical expenditure in 2013 (t+1) as an 
exponential function of covariates. Et[lnYt+1] is the expectation at time t of log expenditure in t+1. All 
covariates are 2012 values, except  that the 2011 value (in addition to the 2012 value) of total 
realized medical expenditure is included. Models also include the share of household member in 
gender specific age groups and district dummies. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at Kebele level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. Do expectations influence the decision to insure? 
If indeed respondents are able to use available information to anticipate, to some extent, 
their future medical expenses, then one might suppose that the information incorporated in 
the reported expectations will be utilised in deciding whether to take out health insurance. 
The regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6 show that expected medical expenditure is 
positively, but not significantly, associated with insurance enrolment. Even if one overlooks 
the lack of significance, it is not clear what to make of the fact that sample households with 
insurance report higher expected medical expenses.23 Coverage would be expected to reduce 
OOP payments, although the scheme has been found to have no significant impact on 
households’ medical spending while raising utilization of health services (Mebratie et al 2013). 
The positive correlation may therefore reflect selection – households with greater expected 
payments are more likely to be enrolled.24 But testing this hypothesis requires examination 
of whether expectations subsequently influence the decision to enrol.  
To do this, we restrict attention to districts in which the insurance scheme was offered 
and to households within those districts that had not yet taken the opportunity to enrol by 
the time of the 2012 survey when the expectations questions were first asked. For these 
households, we examine the relationship between the distribution of forecast medical 
expenditures for the year ahead and the propensity to take out coverage during the course 
of that year. Given the insurance premium does not depend on individual risk, those who 
                                                          
23 The insurance scheme operates by issuing a card that entitles the holder to free care at contracted facilities. 
There is no payment and subsequent reimbursement. Hence, if a household takes its coverage into account in 
reporting expected expenditure, it is likely to be reporting OOP payments and not the gross value of the health 
care anticipated to be accessed through insurance.  
 
24 Since there are no copayments under the scheme, moral hazard (with a high price elasticity) would not result 
in increased payments unless increased access to low levels of treatment resulted in referral to higher levels of 
treatment with associated expenditures. But even if there were such an effect, anticipation of it would require 
very sophisticated agents, which villagers experiencing the first two years of operation of a health insurance 
scheme are unlikely to be.  
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report a higher expectation in 2012 have a greater incentive to enrol by 2013.  Besides adverse 
selection on expected expenses, insurance is presumed to be motivated by its potential to 
reduce the variability of expenses. If households hold information on the degree of dispersion 
in their future medical expenses that they are able to express in the subjective probability 
questions and they do indeed seek to reduce this risk exposure, then, for a given degree of 
risk aversion, those who report a higher standard deviation of future medical expenditure in 
2012 will be more likely to have enrolled by 2013.  
In Table 8 we split households that were not enrolled in the insurance scheme in 2012 
according to enrolment status in 2013. One quarter of households enrolled between the two 
surveys. For each group, we show in the top panel the sample means of the first two moments 
of the one-year-ahead medical expenditure distribution derived from the probabilities 
reported in 2012. Contrary to the hypotheses that enrolment is motivated by adverse 
selection and risk exposure, there is no difference in either the means or standard deviations 
by insurance status.25 The bottom panel gives means of the parameters of the distributions 
reported in 2013. Those who enrolled between 2012 and 2013 reported subjective 
probabilities that imply a 38 percent higher mean and a 31 percent higher standard deviation 
of forecast expenditure than those who chose to remain without insurance. This is puzzling 
since coverage would be expected to reduce both the expectation and the dispersion of the 
distribution. It may be that changed circumstances, such as the onset of illness, caused 
households to revise their expectations upward and to insure.  
                                                          
25 The expectations of medical expenditure reported in 2012 could possibly take into account plans to enrol in 
the insurance scheme in the coming year and the consequences this would have for OOP payments. To take 
account of this possibility, we have restricted the sample further to households not enrolled in 2012 and who 
declare at that point that they have no plans to enrol. This does not change the conclusion (from both bivariate 
and multivariate analyses) of there being no significant difference in expectations between those who do and 
do not subsequently enrol. 
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Table 8: Sample averages of mean and standard deviation of future medical expenditure by 
entry to insurance --  households not enrolled in 2012  
 
 Insurance status in 2013 p-value of test 
equality of 
means 
 
Enrolled Not enrolled 
Expectations reported in 2012    
 Mean 404  376 0.488 
 Standard deviation 154 153 0.958 
Expectations reported in 2013    
 Mean 632 462 0.013 
 Standard deviation 247 169 0.020 
     
No. of observations 127 353  
Notes: Sample restricted to districts in which insurance is offered and to households who had not enrolled by 
2012. Only households who gave logical responses in both years are reported.  
 
As is clear from the  probit marginal effects estimates given in the first column of Table 
9, conditioning on covariates does not change the conclusion that the probability of enrolling 
in the insurance scheme between 2013 and 2012 does not vary with either the mean or the 
standard deviation of (log) forecast medical expenditures reported in 2012.26 Past medical 
expenditure and health variables are excluded from the model since these may provide 
information that is incorporated into expectations of future expenses that subsequently 
influence insurance enrolment.27 Households in higher wealth quintile groups are more likely 
to insure, as are those living close to health facilities offering better quality care .28  
 
  
                                                          
26 The mean and standard deviation of expected expenditure are highly correlated (ρ=0.788), which might be 
considered an explanation for neither being individually significant. When the model is re-estimated first 
including only the mean (and covariates) and then only the standard deviation, neither is significant.  
 
27 In fact, including lagged realized medical expenditure and health indicators has little or no influence on the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the expectations variables. 
 
28 The perceived quality of care is reported by the head of the nearest health facility. The specific question is: 
“Do you think this health center is providing the expected standard of health care services?” This was asked in a 
survey of 48 health centers (3 from each of the 16 districts) conducted in April-May 2011 (Mebratie et al. 2015).   
32 
 
Table 9: Probit estimates of probability of actual and planned insurance enrolment for 
households not initially enrolled (marginal effects) 
 
  Actually enrolled by 2013 Plan to enroll 
  
Marginal 
effect 
Robust SE Marginal 
effect 
Robust SE 
     
Mean log forecast medical exp. 0.0254 (0.0235) -0.00761 (0.0193) 
Standard deviation log forecast medical exp. -0.127 (0.0777) 0.323*** (0.0854) 
Assets quintile groups  
(ref. is bottom)  
 
 
 
     2nd bottom 0.0789 (0.0713) 0.135*** (0.0470) 
     Middle 0.165** (0.0715) 0.168*** (0.0531) 
     2nd top 0.153** (0.0770) 0.162** (0.0638) 
     Top 0.159* (0.0814) 0.0860 (0.0701) 
Covered by safety net programme 0.0637 (0.0582) 0.0286 (0.0542) 
Has bank account 0.0892 (0.0738) -0.0847 (0.0625) 
Educated head 0.0386 (0.0347) -0.00759 (0.0351) 
Head of hhold holds official position 0.00144 (0.0486) 0.0657* (0.0392) 
Forgone care when sick -0.0358 (0.109) 0.0738 (0.0858) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000290 (0.000443) -0.000269 (0.000452) 
Quality of care at nearest health center 0.142*** (0.0542) -0.100 (0.0663) 
Ln(household size) 0.00252 (0.0519) 0.220*** (0.0598) 
Muslim 0.0335 (0.0761) -0.159** (0.0626) 
Tigray region 0.297*** (0.113) 0.223** (0.0943) 
Amhara region 0.220** (0.104) 0.0288 (0.102) 
Oromiya region 0.0619 (0.0985) 0.288*** (0.0908) 
Year dummy   -0.0304 (0.0393) 
     
Observations 592  1,068  
Pseudo R2 0.113  0.108  
Notes: The sample for the left-hand column includes all households that were not enrolled in 2012. The 
dependent variable is an indicator of whether the household had enrolled by 2013. The sample for the 
right-hand column includes all households that were not enrolled in 2012 and/or 2013. The respective 
dependent variable is an indicator of whether the respondent reported that the household planned to 
enrol. The models also include the share of household members in gender specific age groups. Standard 
errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at Kebele level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Ability to pay appears to be a strong constraint on enrolment. Given this, it could be 
that households form plans to enrol based on expectations of medical expenses that they are 
not able to realise. To examine this hypothesis, we restrict the sample to households that 
were not enrolled in 2012 and/or 2013 and model their declared intention to enrol as a 
function of expectations and covariates.  The probit marginal effects presented in the right-
hand column of Table 9 reveal that while the likelihood of planning to enrol does not vary 
with the mean of (log) forecast expenditure, it rises positively and significantly with the 
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standard deviation.29 This is consistent with perceived high volatility of medical expenses 
motivating plans to insure, even if those plans are not ultimately implemented. Failure to 
fulfill plans may be due to time-inconsistency, although it is not necessarily indicative of this 
(Giné et al. 2014, Halevy 2015).30  
All in all, despite the fact that expectations do appear to be formed on the basis of 
relevant information, including past medical expenses, and are to a limited extent predictive 
of future expenses, there is no strong evidence that these expectations are used in the 
decision to take out health insurance. Greater perceived risk of medical expenses may raise 
the willingness to insure, if not actual enrolment.  
 
8. Conclusion   
Our unique elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical expenditures reveals that the 
majority of the rural Ethiopians sampled are able to provide logically consistent responses, in 
the sense of satisfying monotonicity, that correlate with past expenses and predict future 
spending. This positive finding echoes that of other exercises in the elicitation of probabilistic 
expectations of various outcomes conducted in developing countries (Attanasio 2009; 
Delavande et al. 2011; Delavande, 2014). It suggests that measurement of household-specific 
distributions of future expenditure offers a feasible alternative to reliance on the cross-
sectional variance of medical expenses that, even after conditioning on covariates, is likely to 
substantially overstate the risk faced by any one household. But households do make 
                                                          
29 A simple test of differences in sample means between those who plan to enrol and those who do not shows 
no significant difference in the expectation of future spending (ETB 437 vs ETB 412) but a significantly higher 
standard deviation for those planning to enrol (ETB 177 vs ETB 141). 
 
30 Of the households not enrolled in 2012, 59% (354/604) report that they plan to enrol in the insurance scheme. 
Of those households, only 26% (91/354) had actually enrolled by 2013. Both the mean and standard deviation 
of forecast expenditure reported in 2012 are slightly higher for those who do realise their plan to enrol (mean: 
414 vs 381, standard deviation: 164 vs 153) but neither difference is significant. 
34 
 
mistakes in assessing their risk exposure. We find that the strength of the relationship 
between expected and past medical spending exceeds the degree of persistence in actual 
expenditure. Previously high spending households may therefore overestimate the extent to 
which they will gain from insurance. If these households were to respond to this 
misperception, then the selection would not be as adverse as would be presumed on the basis 
of the correlation between enrolment and past expenses. This is not to say that there is no 
scope for adverse selection. To a limited extent, expected expenditure predicts realized 
spending even after conditioning on covariates. But we find no evidence that households act 
on this private information. Expectations do not appear to influence the decision to take out 
health insurance. This is somewhat at odds with the literature, although evidence of 
behaviour responding to health expectations captured by subjective probabilities mostly 
comes from one country (Malawi) and one health condition (HIV/AIDS) (Delavande and Kohler 
2012; Shapira 2013; de Paula et al. 2014). The finding that plans to insure, if not actual 
enrolment, are positively related to the perceived dispersion of medical expenses suggests 
that the desire for insurance is (partly) driven by risk exposure. We can only speculate on why 
this motivation does not become effective demand. It could be lack of ability to pay, which 
does appear to be a strong determinant of insurance enrolment. Households living close to 
subsistence may be particularly prone to time inconsistency (Giné et al. 2014). From a 
distance, enrolment in health insurance to relieve stress arising from volatile medical 
expenses can seem attractive. But when the time comes to pay the premium, the urgency of 
other needs may take precedence over a payment to cover medical care that may not even 
be needed.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to elicit beliefs about future 
spending on health care. As such, it inevitably suffers from limitations that future research 
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should take care not to repeat. First, a feature of medical expenditure data is that many 
households spend nothing. Our instrument did not explicitly offer zero expenditure as a 
possible outcome. It may be preferable to first ask about the probability of spending anything 
at all on health care, and then the probabilities of spending within categories over the range 
of positive amounts. Second, the instrument asked about expectations of medical 
expenditure over one year, while actual expenditure on ambulatory care was recorded for 
the past two months. This inconsistency, which hampers comparison of the levels of expected 
and realized expenditure but is less of an impediment to correlation analysis, is not easy to 
resolve since extension of the recall period for ambulatory care is likely to increase 
measurement error. Third, the finding that expectations do not appear to influence the 
decision to insure may partly be due to the fact that two-fifths of households offered 
insurance had already enrolled by the time the first expectations data were collected. It would 
be preferable to collect expectations data from the time at which insurance is first offered. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings from this study are sufficiently encouraging 
to warrant further research into how expectations of medical expenditures are formed and 
utilized in a number of contexts. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1: Means of medical expenditures and selected covariates by subjective probability non-
response, enumeration error and  violation of logical consistency 
 
Excluded due to non-response / 
enumeration error 
Subjective probabilities exhibit logical 
inconsistencies 
 
Yes 
(N=89) 
No 
(N=3093) 
No 
difference 
p-value 
Yes  
(N=432) 
No  
(N=2668) 
No 
difference  
p-value 
Health insurance enrolled 
(%) 27.0 33.6 0.189 19.9 35.8 0.000 
Outpatient expense (ETB) 42.1 53.7 0.648 50.8 54.1 0.788 
Inpatient expense (ETB) 10.7 54.1 0.416 46.7 55.2 0.745 
Health measures 
Illness > 30 days 12.4% 11.9% 0.895 13.9% 11.6% 0.177 
Sensory impairment 18.0% 15.5% 0.523 18.1% 15.2% 0.126 
Paralysis/mobility problem 24.7% 17.7% 0.088 21.8% 17.1% 0.019 
Death in last year 2.2% 1.9% 0.818 1.2% 2.0% 0.222 
Poor/very poor health 19.1% 14.8% 0.267 13.4% 15.1% 0.373 
Measures of socio-economic status 
Poorest assets quintile 
group 36.0% 19.6% 0.000 30.6% 17.8% 0.000 
Assets quintile 2 13.5% 20.2% 0.118 15.7% 20.9% 0.014 
Assets quintile 3 21.4% 20.0% 0.745 21.1% 19.8% 0.527 
Assets quintile 4 12.4% 20.2% 0.067 18.3% 20.6% 0.265 
Richest assets quintile 
group 16.9% 20.1% 0.458 14.4% 20.9% 0.002 
Has bank account 5.6% 12.1% 0.062 9.7% 12.5% 0.099 
Covered  by safety net 
programme 25.3% 20.5% 0.282 24.1% 20.0% 0.052 
Forgone care when sick 6.7% 2.5% 0.013 3.7% 2.3% 0.089 
Minutes to nearest health 
center 57.4 59.9 0.560 52.4 61.1 0.000 
Educated head 46.6% 54.1% 0.162 54.4% 54.1% 0.884 
Non-agricultural 
employment 2.3% 3.8% 0.461 5.6% 3.5% 0.036 
Shock 39.3% 47.6% 0.125 48.6% 47.3% 0.623 
Demographic variables 
Ln(househod size) 1.458 1.666 0.000 1.616 1.674 0.013 
Muslim 15.9% 26.9% 0.021 20.1% 28.0% 0.001 
Note: For definitions of enumeration error and logical inconsistencies in subjective probability responses, see 
notes to Table 1. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table A3. 
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Table A2: Sample statistics of forecast and realized medical expenditure, 2013 (ETB) 
   Cross-section statistics 
   Mean Std. dev. Min. Median Max. Obs. 
 Forecast Expenditure (t+1)       
  Mean 674 830 16.00 390 10325 1303 
  Standard deviation 255 427 3.14 123 8443 1303 
  Coeff. of variation 0.36 0.18 0.03 0.34 0.96 1303 
 Realized Expenditure (t)       
  Simple extrapolation 365 1496 0 0 34800 1303 
  Regression extrapolation 367 1095 ~0 120 25945 1287 
If realized expenditure >0       
 
Mean forecast expenditure 
(t+1) 814 923 28 478 7038 
362 
 Realized expenditure (t) 1315 2611 12 510 34800 362 
Notes: Simple and regression extrapolation of realized expenditures refer to method of estimating annual 
spending on outpatient care from reported expenditure in past two months, as explained in text.  Sample 
size for regression extrapolation is slightly smaller due to missing values on covariates. ETB = Ethiopian Birr, 
US$1=ETB 18.45 (April 2013) 
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Table A3: Descriptions and summary statistics of variables 
 
Variable 
 
 
Description 
2012 (N=1365) 2013 (N=1303) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Health insurance enrolled Enrolled in community based health insurance 33.0%  38.7%  
Outpatient expense Out-of-pocket outpatient payment (past 2 months) 56.5 217.3 51.5 233.1 
Inpatient expense Out-of-pocket inpatient payment (past 12 months) 54.3 541.1 56.1 503.7 
Ln (average of Min & Max 
forecast OOP) 
Log of simple average of minimum and maximum forecast health 
expenditure 5.8 1.0 6.1 1.1 
Et[lnYt+1] Expectation of log forecast health expenditure 5.6 0.9 5.8 1.1 
Illness > 30 days 
At least one member with chronic illness (symptoms stayed more 
than 30 days) 10.6%  12.7%  
Sensory impairment At least one member has difficulty to hear/speak/ or see 12.6%  17.9%  
Paralysis/mobility problem 
At least one member has some sort of paralysis or difficulty to stand 
up after sitting down 13.6%  20.8%  
Death in last year Household member died in the past 12 months 2.6%  1.5%  
Poor/very poor health At least one member has poor/very poor self-assessed health 12.5%  17.8%  
Bottom assets quintile 
group 
Bottom 20% of full sample on principal components score based on 
possession of assets and housing conditions 18.6%  17.0%  
2nd bottom assets quintile 
group 
Assets index in 20-40% of full sample  
20.5%  21.3%  
Middle assets quintile 
group 
Assets index in 40-60% of full sample 
19.4%  20.1%  
2nd top assets quintile group Assets index in 60-80% of full sample 20.5%  20.7%  
Top assets quintile group Assets index in top 20% of full sample 21.0%  20.9%  
Has bank account Household has saving bank account 11.6%  13.4%  
Covered  by safety net 
programme 
Household member of productive safety net program (PSNP),  yes=1, 
no=0 (a targeted program in food insecure Woredas) 20.5%  19.5%  
Continued on next page 
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Table A3 (continued): Decriptions and summary statistics of variables 
 
Variable 
 
 
Description 
2012 (N=1365) 2013 (N=1303) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Forgone care when sick 
Someone was ill in last two months but did not receive treatment 
because of one of the following: a) health care/medicines are too 
expensive b) health facilities are too far c) could not take time off work / 
lose income 2.5%  2.1%  
Minutes to nearest health 
center 
Travel time to nearest health center (minutes) 
62.8 41.3 59.3 39.9 
Educated head  Househld head has at least informal education 56.4%  51.6%  
Non-agri employment Household head’s main occupation: non-agricultural employment 2.9%  4.1%  
Ln(househod size) Log household size 1.684 0.446 1.664 0.455 
Muslim Religion of the household head is Muslim 27.1%  29.0%  
Shock 
Household reported experiencing shock in last 12 months arising from  
crime/conflict (divorce, land / water conflict, theft of crops, theft of 
livestock), economy (decline in price of output, unemployment, loss of 
equipment, death of livestock) or nature (flood, storm, fire, drought, 
untimely rain, insect damage). 44.2%  50.7%  
Notes: Standard deviations not given for binary variables. Regression models also include the share of household members in ten age-sex groups. 
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Table A4. Least absolute deviation regression of the Mean of Log Forecast  Medical Expenditure  
 LAD 
  Coeff. Robust SE 
   
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0170* (0.00986) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0259** (0.0110) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.142*** (0.0305) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 0.0159 (0.0299) 
Someone in household has:   
    Illness > 30 days 0.228** (0.0886) 
    Sensory impairment 0.0279 (0.0775) 
    Paralysis/mobility issues -0.0547 (0.0741) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.118 (0.0731) 
    Died in last year 0.0583 (0.193) 
Assets quintile groups  
(ref. is bottom)    
     2nd bottom 0.153* (0.0893) 
     Middle 0.269*** (0.0965) 
     2nd top 0.287*** (0.0909) 
     Top 0.531*** (0.102) 
Covered by safety net programme -0.154** (0.0635) 
Has bank account 0.103 (0.0664) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.212 (0.149) 
Educated head 0.115** (0.0511) 
Health insurance enrolled 0.0738 (0.0514) 
Forgone care when sick -0.133 (0.153) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000766 (0.00067) 
Shock 0.151*** (0.0474) 
Ln(household size) 0.0870 (0.0935) 
Year 2013 0.234*** (0.0442) 
Constant 3.776*** (0.267) 
   
Observations 2,631  
R2 0.159  
F-test  of joint significance  
(p-values):   
     All variables 0.000  
     Health variables 0.010  
     Age-sex composition 0.036  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member 
in ten gender specific age groups and district dummies. Standard 
errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at Kebele 
level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5. Regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6 with dependent variable replaced by  log of 
simple average of minimum and maximum forecast medical expenditure  
 Levels First difference 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
        
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0251*** 0.104* 0.0424*** 0.251*** 
 (0.00833) (0.0537) (0.0149) (0.0861) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0392*** 0.121*** 0.0522*** 0.262*** 
 (0.00903) (0.0411) (0.0158) (0.0878) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.140*** 0.128*** 0.112** 0.117** 
 (0.0228) (0.0251) (0.0504) (0.0542) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -0.00426 -0.0203 -0.0429 -0.0643 
 (0.0230) (0.0245) (0.0480) (0.0554) 
Someone in household has:     
    Illness > 30 days 0.172** 0.0594 0.0164 -0.0238 
 (0.0756) (0.0952) (0.146) (0.147) 
    Sensory impairment 0.0112 0.00769 -0.0478 -0.0658 
 (0.0599) (0.0611) (0.0952) (0.108) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.0241 -0.00416 0.177** 0.160* 
 (0.0561) (0.0600) (0.0825) (0.0834) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.0619 -0.0444 0.0830 -0.0504 
 (0.0790) (0.0859) (0.121) (0.134) 
    Death in last year 0.0969 0.0500 0.168 0.205 
 (0.133) (0.142) (0.248) (0.273) 
Assets quintile groups  
(ref. is bottom)     
2nd bottom 0.222*** 0.213*** 0.0615 -0.00627 
 (0.0620) (0.0635) (0.102) (0.102) 
Middle 0.314*** 0.306*** 0.204 0.105 
 (0.0655) (0.0658) (0.123) (0.128) 
2nd top 0.422*** 0.395*** 0.254** 0.198 
 (0.0683) (0.0727) (0.122) (0.134) 
Top 0.660*** 0.614*** 0.630*** 0.589*** 
 (0.0759) (0.0798) (0.152) (0.155) 
Enrolled in PSNP -0.0259 -0.0154 0.176 0.244 
 (0.0569) (0.0620) (0.168) (0.171) 
Has bank account 0.0706 0.0591 0.195* 0.267** 
 (0.0672) (0.0691) (0.118) (0.118) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.142 0.117 0.196 0.108 
 (0.127) (0.124) (0.235) (0.245) 
Educated head 0.0746* 0.0642 0.123 0.0927 
 (0.0400) (0.0418) (0.0897) (0.0959) 
Continued on next page 
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Table A5 (continued). Regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6 with dependent variable replaced 
by log of simple average of minimum and maximum forecast medical expenditure  
 Levels First difference 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
        
Health insurance enrolled 0.0348 0.0537 0.0234 0.0541 
 (0.0453) (0.0441) (0.0843) (0.0797) 
Forgone care when sick -0.0551 -0.0295 -0.0293 -0.0660 
 (0.121) (0.128) (0.167) (0.192) 
Minutes to nearest health 
center 0.000781* 0.000710 0.00105 0.00108 
 (0.000453) (0.000483) (0.00111) (0.00123) 
Shock 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.135* 0.145* 
 (0.0526) (0.0535) (0.0794) (0.0803) 
Ln(household size) -0.0522 -0.114 0.464* 0.531** 
 (0.0708) (0.0797) (0.239) (0.256) 
Year 2013 0.254*** 0.285***   
 (0.0729) (0.0697)   
Constant 3.840*** 3.921*** 0.281*** 0.336*** 
 (0.192) (0.203) (0.0740) (0.0677) 
     
Observations 2,631 2,631 1,097 1,097 
R-squared 0.269 0.220 0.078   
F-test (P-value) for joint 
significance:   
  
     All variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Health variables 0.068 0.969 0.290 0.493 
     Age-sex composition 0.003 0.001 0.475 0.273 
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific 
age groups. In columns 1 and 2, district dummies are also included. Standard errors in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at Kebele level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table A6. Regressions of the standard deviation of log forecast medical expenditure 
  OLS 2SLS 
 Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE 
      
Ln(outpatient expense) t -0.00149 (0.00317) -0.00723 (0.0166) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 -0.000115 (0.00245) 0.000435 (0.0107) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.00780 (0.00600) 0.00870 (0.00620) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -1.97e-05 (0.00743) 0.000283 (0.00764) 
Someone in household has:     
    Illness > 30 days -0.0153 (0.0206) -0.00920 (0.0262) 
    Sensory impairment -0.00909 (0.0148) -0.00811 (0.0147) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.0198 (0.0168) 0.0203 (0.0168) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.00275 (0.0202) 0.00811 (0.0245) 
    Death in last year -0.0501* (0.0291) -0.0517* (0.0294) 
Assets quintile groups  
(ref. is bottom)     
     2nd bottom 0.0139 (0.0159) 0.0146 (0.0161) 
     Middle 0.0359* (0.0186) 0.0365* (0.0187) 
     2nd top 0.0617*** (0.0194) 0.0626*** (0.0195) 
     Top 0.0688*** (0.0215) 0.0700*** (0.0223) 
Covered  by safety net programme 0.0276** (0.0134) 0.0277** (0.0132) 
Has bank account 0.00268 (0.0160) 0.00345 (0.0156) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.0132 (0.0306) 0.0154 (0.0308) 
Educated head 0.00902 (0.0102) 0.00856 (0.0104) 
Health insurance enrolled -0.00756 (0.0129) -0.00940 (0.0141) 
Forgone care when sick 0.0151 (0.0323) 0.0123 (0.0321) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000108 (0.00016) 0.000109 (0.000156) 
Shock 0.00530 (0.0124) 0.00550 (0.0125) 
Ln(household size) -0.0274 (0.0187) -0.0255 (0.0189) 
Year 2013 0.00685 (0.0154) 0.00632 (0.0158) 
Constant 0.289*** (0.0405) 0.284*** (0.0422) 
     
Observations 2,631  2,631  
R-squared 0.099  0.097  
F-test (P-value) for joint 
significance:     
     All variables 0.000  0.000  
     Health variables 0.336  0.297  
     Age-sex composition 0.790  0.765  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific age 
groups and district dummies. Standard errors i(n parentheses) are corrected for 
clustering at Kebele level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
